Reading Response #3

In part III of his Politics of the Earth (2005), John Dryzek analyzes the main environmental discourses that comprise the approach of “solving environmental problems”. The three discourses framed by this approach are administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism. Out of these three, I wish to pay particular attention to administrative rationalism, not only because it was the first to be developed and employed, thus having a substantial record of results to analyze, but also because it currently supports the model of environmental policy in some parts of the developing world. In Central America, for instance, environmental policy is heavily dependent on institutions and practices of administrative rationalism, such as resource-management bureaucracies and environmental impact assessments. That is why I would like to reflect on the weaknesses of these practices, since even though some might have been already resolved in the United States and other pioneers in environmentalism, they still pose challenges in other countries that rely on them to formulate and apply environmental policy.

Dryzek first looks at professional resource-management bureaucracies as institutions of administrative rationalism. A centralized environmental authority (usually a Ministry of the Environment in Central America) is necessary to create, organize, execute, and enforce environmental policy. However, a high level of technical specialization is required, and as Dryzek points out, key positions can at times be appointed to non-specialists (77, 85). The risk is even greater in developing countries where cultures of patronage, nepotism, and co-opting often lead to positions being handed out with little regard to technical qualifications.

Polution control agencies, another institution of administrative rationalism, are also not exempt of vulnerabilities. Dryzek provides an example in the case of the “politicization of science”, whereby scientists can be replaced with pro-industry partisans in these agencies, thus altering the outcome of anti-pollution legislation that is supposed to be informed by scientific findings (79). Again, the risks are higher in the context of developing countries, where it is more common for powerful private interests to exert their influence over governmental decisions.

Regulatory policy instruments are another tool whose application can be problematic. Dryzek notes how, in the United States, the ultimate outcome of these regulatory instruments rests on judicial decisions, which are often preceded by costly and protracted litigation (80). Once more, this weakness can be exacerbated in developing countries, where courts can be more ineffective, misinformed, and corrupt.

Environmental impact assessments, expert advisory commissions, and rationalistic policy analysis techniques are other institutions that administrative rationalism prescribes, but they also contain some of the weaknesses of those practices discussed above. Environmental impact assessments are not only subject to economic pressures, but also depend significantly on courts for their interpretation and implementation (81). Expert advisory commissions and policy analysis techniques require a large amount of scientific expertise, which is not always sufficiently available in developing countries.

Facing these problems, a common sense suggestion would be to move towards democratic pragmatism, as the U.S. and some European countries have done, but this also poses a challenge in the developing world, where, by and large and at best, democracies are not yet fully consolidated.